

No Identity without an Entity

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5

1 INTRODUCTION

Peter Geach's *puzzle of intentional identity* is to analyze this sentence:

G Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow. (1967: 147)

10 Specifically, we must analyze it as a true report of *intentional identity*—roughly, as correctly reporting that while Hob and Nob in some sense have attitudes about the same witch, there is no witch (in fact no entity) they have attitudes about. But this is deeply obscure: the objects of Hob's and Nob's attitudes cannot be identical if there are no such objects—there is no identity without an entity. Still, G might be
15 a natural way to report their attitudes even if nothing was an object of both their attitudes. So Geach and many others think G must have an intentional identity reading; the problem is that stating it precisely, within a plausible linguistic theory, is extremely hard.

The puzzle has drawn dozens of responses, as varied as remedies for hiccups,
20 and often as odd. There is no consensus what it is even about. It combines the obscure notion of intentional identity with a difficult kind of anaphora and the potentially problematic term 'witch'. And it belongs to Geach's program of analyzing certain problematic "intentional" constructions, a program that is ill defined: his class of cases varies from paper to paper, as do his approximate and impression-
25 istic descriptions of the problems. This makes it easy to read various views and programs into his papers, and into the puzzle specifically. My goal is to determine what the puzzle is really about. In §2 I distinguish the issues it combines. To clarify the alleged intentional identity reading, I will carefully interpret Geach's program (§3) and his presentation of the puzzle (§§4–5). In (§6) I reduce his problems to
30 ones familiar from the philosophy of fiction—specifically, problems with describing alleged representations of fictional objects. This reduction does not solve the puzzle, but it shows where to look for solutions, and where *not* to look.

2 PUZZLE PIECES

G illustrates two problems besides intentional identity. First, it seems to contain a problematic kind of anaphora.¹ To see why, consider a simpler case:

1 A witch has blighted Bob's mare, and she killed Cob's sow.

5 In 1, the occurrence of the pronoun 'she' is anaphoric on the occurrence of 'a witch' (the latter is the former's *antecedent*.) But how exactly are they related? On a common view, the former is a variable, and the latter is a quantifier phrase which binds it. So 1 seems to have the following truth-conditions:

1' $\exists x(x \text{ is a witch} \wedge x \text{ has blighted Bob's mare} \wedge x \text{ killed Cob's sow})$.

10 In other cases, anaphoric pronoun-occurrences seem to stand in for *repetitions* of their antecedents. In 'Smith hid where no one saw her', the occurrence of 'her' is anaphoric on the occurrence of 'Smith', and in effect stands in for a second occurrence of that name. But some cases do not fit either of these models. Consider one of Geach's "donkey sentences" such as

15 2 Any man who owns a donkey beats it. (1980: 143)

The occurrence of 'it' is anaphoric on the occurrence of 'a donkey', but does not stand in for a repetition of it. Nor can the former be a variable bound by the latter; we might try to formalize it as

2' $\forall x([x \text{ is a man} \wedge \exists y(y \text{ is a donkey} \wedge x \text{ owns } y)] \rightarrow x \text{ beats } y)$,

20 but here the last occurrence of 'y' is outside the scope of 'there is a donkey y'. This is one of many cases where a pronoun-occurrence seem to function more like a bound variable-occurrence than like a repetition of its antecedent, but where it is not in the scope of its antecedent.² Since it has left the scope of its antecedent expression-occurrence to make mischief elsewhere, I will call it a *rogue* occurrence and call this a case of rogue anaphora. In G, the occurrence of 'she' is anaphoric
25 on the occurrence of 'a witch'.³ But the sentence seems to be a conjunction, with 'a

1. Some commentators (e.g., Nicholas Asher (1987: §6.3) and Cumming (2007: 3–4)) extend the term 'anaphora' to include historical chains of referrals linked by speakers' intentions to corefer with earlier links. Here I use it strictly in the sense of a syntactic (though often unexpressed) connection between occurrences of linguistic expressions.

2. In linguistic terms, the antecedent does not *c-command* the pronoun-occurrence: in the sentence's syntactic tree, the first branching node dominating the former does *not* dominate the latter (Reinhart, 1976: 31–32).

3. This seems to be the point of the parenthesis 'the same witch', which Geach calls a "gloss" on the occurrence of 'she' (1967: 150). So I assume the puzzle is to analyze G *without* that parenthesis,

witch' occurring in the first conjunct and 'she' in the second, so that the former's scope does not include the latter (Geach, 1967: 147, 150); thus the latter is a rogue.

Rogue anaphora has been studied extensively, but there is still no consensus on its semantics. For example, Geach attempts to analyze rogues as *pronouns of laziness*, standing in for "a repetitious phrase somehow reconstructable out of the antecedent" (1975: 194).⁴ And Gareth Evans would call rogues *E-type pronouns*, saying among other things that "they are singular terms whose reference is fixed by description" (1977: 492; 1980). I will mention a few more theories in §5. But note well: the problem of rogue anaphora is independent of intentional identity, contrary to some commentators (who perhaps confuse Geach's puzzle about G with the more general problem of understanding intentional identity).⁵ Most of Geach's examples of intentional identity reports are anaphora-free; for example, 'Smith and Brown admire the same poet' (1964a: 137–38) and 'Hob and Nob meant to refer to the same person' (1967: 150).⁶ And there is rogue anaphora without intentional identity, as in 2.

The other problem G illustrates concerns general terms like 'witch'. Like the terms 'Zeus', 'unicorn', and 'phlogiston', 'witch' originated in *myth* (i.e., widespread false belief). As with terms originating in fiction, such as 'Spock', 'hobbit', and 'flubber', mythical terms may raise semantic problems. The problems with fictional and mythical *names* are well known: allegedly they do not name anything, and thus somehow disrupt the semantics of sentences containing them. And if Kripke is right that many *general terms* (such as natural kind terms) are effectively names of kinds (1980: 127), then mythical general terms may be as defective as mythical proper names.⁷ He considers the term 'unicorn', which he assumes was introduced as a species name under the mistaken belief that someone had identified a species, specifically one superficially like a horse with one horn on its head. Since no species was named, 'unicorn' was not really given a semantic value. Thus "statements about unicorns, like statements about Sherlock Holmes, ... don't really

but merely reading the occurrence of 'she' as anaphoric in this way. I discuss pronominal phrases like 'the same witch' at the end of §3.

4. He originally used the term 'pronoun of laziness' only for pronoun-occurrences substituting for repetitions of their antecedent (1980: 151–52). On the extension, see his 1964b (97–98), 1967 (150), and 1975 (194–95).

5. The commentators include Esa Saarinen (1978: 157), Walter Edelberg (1986), Nicholas Asher (1987: 126), Nino B. Cocchiarella (1989: 30), Jeffrey King (1993: 63–65), Ahti Pietarinen (2001: 148), and Robert van Rooy (2006: 128).

6. By my count, only four of his fourteen examples (see the end of §3) have anaphoric pronouns.

7. Geach denies the conclusion; he says such terms simply have empty extensions (1980: 203–4). See also his 1980 (15, 186–88, 217), 1969 (156–65), and 1976 (313).

express propositions” (2011: 67–71; cf. 1980: 156–58). We need not accept that conclusion, but this at least shows the semantics of such terms is problematic. That includes ‘witch’, which may have been introduced to name a kind of person, under the mistaken belief that someone had identified such a kind, perhaps: person
5 who performs a certain kind of supernatural deed.⁸ Since there are no supernatural deeds, no kind of deed or agent was identified and named; therefore such an introduction of ‘witch’ would have been defective.⁹ There is no consensus how to deal with mythical (and fictional, etc.) general terms; in fact very little has been written on them. But note well: the problem of such terms is independent of the problem
10 of intentional identity (and of rogue anaphora). Such terms occur in many other contexts, and are absent from many intentional identity reports, such as the two I gave above.

The problems of rogue anaphora and mythical general terms are separable from intentional identity, and better understood than it. I will set them aside, to focus
15 on intentional identity. *That* one is problematic because Geach has not identified what it is. Instead, he uses the term ‘intentional identity’ for a certain kind of reading of certain sentences, a reading he searches for. To understand his search, we must understand his broader program.

3 GEACH’S PROGRAM

20 In four papers (his 1964a, 1967, 1969, and 1976) Geach discusses the semantics, and especially the logic, of certain “intentional” constructions in natural language. ‘Intentional’ is a technical term, and one that different theorists use quite differently. (In fact, disturbingly few of them even recognize the equivocation.) Geach is not sure how to define it, but he gives some examples of intentional operators. He
25 says propositional attitude verbs such as ‘believe’ are intentional, and so in ‘Eve believes Jeeves leaves’ the expression ‘Jeeves leaves’ is in an intentional context (i.e., in the scope of an intentional operator). Some of the operators take sentential (or

8. The current use of ‘witch’ is hard to define precisely, and its etymology is obscure, so I am not sure it is problematic in exactly the way ‘phlogiston’ is.

9. To many theorists, these problematic terms look like a job for Fregean semantics. Frege says the general term ‘*mōly*’ (used for a magic herb in the *Odyssey*) has a sense but no referent (1892: 133). So in an *ungerade* (indirect speech) context, it *does* have a referent (namely its customary sense); thus a sentence containing it in an *ungerade* context can express a proposition and determine a truth-value. ‘Witch’ *might* be in an *ungerade* context in G (its occurring *after* ‘Hob thinks’ is defeasible evidence). But Frege’s reference-shifting semantics for such contexts, and especially his application of that semantics to nonreferring terms, are controversial (in fact I think they are false), so I will not assume them. As I note in §3, Geach does not wholly accept them either.

infinitival) arguments; call these intentional *sentential operators*. Others take as arguments singular terms and determiner phrases: for example, ‘look for’, ‘dream of’, and some noncontiguous phrases with a sentential operator and a predicate, such as ‘believe — to be a scoundrel’; call these intentional *predicates*.

5 Note well: there are several common views of intentionality that Geach *does not* clearly endorse. First, many philosophers reserve ‘intentional’ (with a ‘t’) for Brentano’s use, namely, for *representational*; they use ‘intensional’ (with an ‘s’) for something else. But Geach declines to distinguish the two spellings (1980: 181). And two of his examples of intentional operators (‘owes’ and ‘is obliged’) are not rep-
10 resentational: I can owe you a horse, or be obligated to marry someone, without anyone or anything representing this. (See n 11.) So it is not clear whether he accepts Brentano’s use. Second, many philosophers use ‘intensional’ (usually with an ‘s’) to mean *nonextensional*. An operator Ψ is extensional if and only if the extension of $\ulcorner \Psi \alpha \urcorner$ is a function of α ’s extension. But Geach distinguishes modal and
15 intentional operators as two kinds of nonextensional operators, so he thinks intentionality is not merely nonextensionality.¹⁰ Third, some philosophers influenced by Carnap (1947: 23) use ‘intensional’ (always with an ‘s’) to mean *Carnap-intensional*; this means the extension of $\ulcorner \Psi \alpha \urcorner$ is a function of α ’s Carnapian intension, which is the function from possible worlds (or state-descriptions) to α ’s extension
20 with respect to them. But Geach never suggests intentional operators are Carnap-intensional. (Some of his commentators do, following Hintikka (1969); see §5.)¹¹ Fourth, though he sometimes (1967: 147) uses Quine’s term ‘opaque’—which Quine uses partly to indicate that quantifying into a context is impossible (1966: 145–50, 152–59)—Geach thinks we *can* quantify into intentional contexts. Finally, philoso-
25 phers influence by Frege often assume intentional operators are *Frege-intensional*; this means the extension of $\ulcorner \Psi \alpha \urcorner$ is a function of α ’s *sense*, that is, its mode of

10. See his 1963 (140), 1964a (138), 1972 (94, 96), and 1967 (149–50). In note 15 I argue that the relevant intentional operators on the relevant readings *are* extensional.

11. Though Geach does not note it, two of his examples *are* Carnap-intensional: ‘is obliged’ (1980: 94, 189) and ‘owe’ (1964a: 130, *passim*; 1967: 148–49). And although he uses Buridan’s example ‘I owe you a horse’, this lacks the problematic reading I discuss below, on which (a) there is no particular horse I owe you, but (b) it is still sensible to purport to identify a horse I that owe you. (The same goes for ‘Tom has obliged himself to marry a sister of Bill’s.’) I suggest these *deontic* operators are modal *instead of* intentional, as Geach himself says elsewhere (1958: 1). (He might assume ‘owe’ is equivalent to ‘promise to give’ (1964a: 134, 136), which is more like his other cases.)

presentation of its extension.¹² Geach sometimes endorses this,¹³ but he once says some intentional operators are *Shakespearean*: this means that for a name β , the extension of $\lceil \Psi \beta \rceil$ is a function of β 's extension, and not necessarily of its sense (1980: 188–89; cf. 1976: 319). So I will not assume intentionality is simply Frege-intensionality.

So which intentional constructions is Geach studying? He does not precisely define the class, but he has a few families of examples. The main family includes 'Peter dreams of a girl' and 'Peter is looking for a detective story'. In general, they have the following form, where α is a noun phrase, Ψ is an intentional predicate, and ϕ is a general term (common noun phrase):

$0^\phi \alpha \Psi a \phi$

Such constructions are ambiguous, as we know from Russell and Quine. But Geach thinks there is a reading they miss, one that is very hard to analyze. I will explain his alleged reading in contrast with theirs. Consider Quine's example 'Ralph believes that someone is a spy'. Russell would say this has a reading giving the existential quantifier 'someone' wider scope than 'believes that', and a reading giving it narrower scope; Quine states these respectively as 'There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy' and 'Ralph believes there are spies'. Geach agrees that 0^ϕ has a wide-scope reading:

0_ϕ^\exists There is a ϕ such that $\alpha \Psi$ it.

But his examples all involve intentional predicates, and existential quantifiers can only take narrow scope with respect to sentential operators, so his alleged reading is not Russell's narrow scope reading (Geach 1967: 149–50; 1976: 315–17).

What about Quine's readings? Quine calls Russell's wide scope reading of 'Ralph believes that someone is a spy' *relational* and the narrow scope reading *notional* (1966: 183–84). But the notional reading is not simply a narrow-scope reading, because even constructions with predicates, such as 'I want a sloop', have notional readings. However, he thinks the notional reading is *like* the narrow scope reading; he paraphrases the notional reading of 'I want a sloop' as 'I wish that $\exists x(x$ is a sloop \wedge I have x)' (ibid.). If that reading is true and the relation false, then "what I seek is mere relief from slooplessness," and it is senseless to identify a sloop

12. Why 'Frege-intensional' instead of 'ungerade'? The latter is German for *indirect* (as in: indirect speech) and it is uncontroversial that indirect speech contexts are intentional. In my terms, Frege gives a controversial analysis of *ungerade* contexts as Frege-intensional, and that analysis is what Geach does not wholly commit to.

13. See his 1964a (130–32, 137), 1967 (149), and 1976 (313–18).

as one that I want. Now consider Geach's example 'Hannibal worships a god'; since the Carthaginians worshipped Ba'al, we would expect this to have a true reading. Geach says its relational reading is false, because there is no god—in fact, no *thing*—that Hannibal worships. He also thinks the notional reading is false, because Hannibal's worship is in some sense *directed*: we can identify—or at least purport to identify—the object of his worship as Ba'al (1969: 161).¹⁴ Geach says, “we very often take ourselves to know, when we hear the discourse of others, that they are meaning to refer to some one person or thing...without ourselves being able to identify this person or thing, without our even being certain that there really is such a person or thing to identify” (1967: 151). Since he thinks the sentence is true, he thinks it has a nonnotional, nonrelational reading. In effect, he thinks the third reading (a) purports to be a relational reading, but (b) can still be true when the (real) relational reading is false. Call his alleged reading *quasirelational*.¹⁵

So Geach's program is to find the quasirelational reading. He thinks it is consistent with the relational reading.¹⁶ For example, the he thinks quasirelational reading of 'Peter dreams of a girl' could be true whether or not there is a girl Peter dreams of. He does not mean it would be true because there is a *dream-girl* (or an *imaginary girl*) that Peter dreams of; Geach does not believe in such things.

14. But see note 23. Likewise it is senseless to say 'Hannibal worships a god, but no god in particular'. Compare Kripke's infelicitous case 'The Greeks worshipped a god, any old god' (1973: 3.12–14). He notes that such cases have a reading as $\lceil \text{For all } x, \text{ if } x \text{ is a } \phi, \text{ then } \alpha \Psi x \rceil$ (cf. Geach, 1980: 91). But this is not Geach's intended reading; I call it the 'I love a parade' reading.

15. He may conflate the notional and quasirelational readings in his 1964a, but he effectively distinguishes them in the passage just quoted, and in his 1980 (186–88), 1969 (161), and 1976 (314–17). Compare his distinction between really and purportedly identifying the state's object with Anscombe's distinction between giving an intentional state's "material object" and giving its "intentional object" (1965: 9–10, and cf. 5). She says the former is possible only if the relational reading is true, while the latter is possible even if the relational reading is false because "the object doesn't exist."

Geach says intentional operators are nonextensional. For example, he says that on the "intentional use" of 'picks out', 'procedure P picks out the coldest State' does not entail 'procedure P picks out the least populous State', even though 'the coldest State' and 'the least populous State' both denote Alaska (1969: 158). But that is a *notional*, undirected reading of 'picks out': if *only* that reading were true, then it would be senseless to identify (or even purport to identify) what is picked out. And notional readings are irrelevant to Geach's program. On the other hand, it seems that intentional predicates on *nonnotional* readings *are* extensional. If we can identify, or purport to identify, the thing picked out, then we can do so by any expression that refers to it. Compare Kripke's case: "suppose the Greeks worshipped Zeus, and Zeus is the tenth god mentioned by Livy. Then the Greeks did worship the tenth god mentioned by Livy" (1973: 3.15; cf. Parsons 1980: 34–35). See also n 19 below.

16. See his 1964a (137–38), 1969 (160), 1976 (317), and compare his 1967 (147).

Instead, he says the quasirelational reading is compatible with there being *nothing* Peter dreams of, girl or not.¹⁷ So the quasirelational reading of 0^ϕ entails neither the truth nor the falsity of this weakened form of 0^\exists :

0^\exists There is *something* such that $\alpha \Psi$ it.¹⁸

5 He also suggests two ways to distinguish the relational and quasirelational readings. One is a word-order convention: ‘There is a girl Peter dreams of’ (or ‘There is a girl such that Peter dreams of her’) places the indefinite description ‘a girl’ *before* the intentional operator ‘dreams of’, and so conventionally expresses the relational reading; ‘Peter dreams of a girl’ places it *after*, and so conventionally expresses the
 10 quasirelational reading (1964a: 131; 1969: 159–61, 163–64).¹⁹ But the second sentence still has the ambiguous form 0^ϕ , so this tells us nothing about the quasirelational reading. His other way to distinguish them is to state the relational reading as ‘Peter dreams of a *particular* girl’ (or instead of ‘particular’, something such as ‘definite’, ‘specifiable’, or ‘identifiable’), and the quasirelational as ‘Peter just dreams of
 15 a girl’.²⁰ But ‘just’ merely excludes a salient alternative, which in some (but not all) contexts is the relational reading (cf. 1969: 159); like the first way, this tells us nothing about the quasirelational reading. Geach seems to recognize this, calling the second way “groping”—“No clue is to be found here to the real logical difference” (1967: 149), and “Heaven only knows why such an explanation works” (1969: 158).

20 Besides the main family of examples, he gives two others. One replaces the indefinite description with a proper name; for example, ‘Hannibal worships Ba‘al’. In general, they have this form, where β is a proper name:

$0^\beta \alpha \Psi \beta$

17. See his 1964a (130), 1967 (149), 1969 (156–60, and cf. 162). Besides ‘dream’ and ‘imaginary’ he also mentions ‘possible’, ‘indefinite’, ‘false’ (as in ‘false god’; ‘mythical’ is clearer), ‘nonexistent’, and ‘fictional’. ‘Indefinite’ is opposed to ‘definite’, which in the relevant use is likely a scope-indicator (see below). It is much less clear the other terms (or their supposed opposites ‘real’ and ‘actual’) are scope indicators on their relevant uses. They seem to be adjectives of a sort including ‘alleged’ and ‘fake’, where for such an adjective χ , ‘ α is a $\chi \phi$ ’ does not entail ‘ α is a ϕ ’. Geach may think that realism about fictional (or mythical, etc.) objects depends mostly on misreading scope indicators as ordinary predicates (see the above references). It does not, as subsequent realists such as Kripke (1973) and Peter van Inwagen (1977) show.

18. See his 1964a (132–33, 135–36), 1967 (147, 151), 1969 (160, 165), and compare his 1976 (313–14).

19. He sometimes assumes that expressions occurring *after* intentional operators express modes of presentation (e.g., 1964a: 131–32), treating those operators more or less as Frege-intensional, and thus as nonextensional. But that too may be a philosopher’s convention rather than English semantics (cf. Eaker, 2009).

20. See his 1964a (130, 133, 134, 136–7), 1967 (149–51), and 1969 (157–59).

Like 0^ϕ , Geach says an instance of 0^β may be true even if a corresponding instance of $0^\bar{\phi}$ is false, and even if the corresponding instance of $0^\bar{\beta}$ is false. For example, he thinks ‘Hannibal worships Ba‘al’ can be true whether or not there is such a god as Ba‘al, even a “false god” (i.e., mythical god) or anything else that Hannibal worships. In this second family of cases it is even more obvious that Geach is not thinking of a narrow-scope or notional reading, because names have no scope (Geach, 1963: 139, 144), and unmistakably function to identify (refer to) things. But he says he does not use ‘Ba‘al’ to refer, but rather as a *quasiname*; he defines a quasiname as one used within intentional contexts without commitment to it really referring or to it being defined *outside* such contexts (1969: 161–63). He says that in using the name ‘Ba‘al’ he merely purports to identify an object of Hannibal’s worship.

The last family of cases is where we find intentional identity. So far I have given *simple* intentional constructions, each of which reports one intentional state. There are also *compound* reports, combining simple reports about different agents, state-types, or state-tokens. Consider ‘Smith and Brown admire the same poet’. Geach says this is ambiguous in the same way as ‘Peter dreams of a girl’. One of its readings is ‘There is a poet that Smith and Brown admire’; on this reading Geach says the sentence expresses “real” or “actual identity,” i.e., the real identity of the objects of Smith’s and Brown’s admiration. Of course, it does not literally do so: it says that something is both the object of Smith’s admiration and of Brown’s, and so it is an existential generalization of a conjunction, not an identity statement.²¹ Geach might better call this the *corelational* reading. He also says that on another reading the sentence expresses “intentional identity” (1964a: 137–38). Though he never defines that term, in the context of his program it is clearly an analogue for compound reports of the quasirelational reading of simple reports, in the same way that the real identity reading corresponds to the relational reading. (He might better call it the *quasi-corelational* reading.) So suppose Smith and Brown both fall for the “Ern Malley” literary hoax,²² in which case Geach would say that ‘Smith admires a poet’ and ‘Brown admires a poet’ are both true *only* on their quasirelational readings. Geach thinks there is nothing they both admire, but that we can still *purport* to identify an object of each person’s admiration as Ern Malley, and even purport to identify a *shared* object of admiration as Ern Malley.²³

21. Thanks to Salmon for this point. He also noted to me that the sentence does not *identify* (or even *purport* to identify) any poet whom Smith and Brown admire; see note 23.

22. Geach’s example alludes to the case of two Australian writers who fooled publishers and critics into thinking there was a poet named ‘Ern Malley’ (1964a: 137; 1969: 164–64).

23. See his 1964a (137–38), 1967 (151), 1969 (161, 164–65), and 1976 (318). Oddly, he says of his case ‘two men [are] worshippers of the same God’ (*sic*) that “in saying ‘the same God’, one purports to

In general, the last family of cases often have something like this form, where PRO_ϕ is a pronominal phrase such as ‘the same ϕ ’ or a pronoun of appropriate gender:

I1 $\alpha_1 \Psi_1$ a ϕ , and $\alpha_2 \Psi_2 \text{PRO}_\phi$, and... $\alpha_n \Psi_n \text{PRO}_\phi$.

- 5 G has this form, where $n = 2$: α_1 is ‘Hob’, α_2 is ‘Nob’, Ψ_1 is ‘thinks — has blighted Bob’s mare’, Ψ_2 is ‘wonders whether — killed Cob’s sow’, ϕ is ‘witch’, and PRO_ϕ is ‘she’ (glossed as ‘the same witch’).²⁴ Where the intentional predicates are the same, the report can be put in this form:

I2 α_1, \dots and $\alpha_n \Psi$ the same ϕ .

- 10 ‘Smith and Brown admire the same poet’ has this form.²⁵ Where the agent is the same, the reports can be put in this form:

I3 $\alpha \Psi_1$ a ϕ , $\Psi_2 \text{PRO}_\phi$, and... $\Psi_n \text{PRO}_\phi$.

- 15 Geach gives examples with a single agent, though he needlessly repeats the subject term: e.g., ‘I saw a man on the stair yesterday at time t_1 , and I saw him (the same man) on the stair again today at time t_2 ’ (1967: 146–47).²⁶ He also sometimes

identify a God,” (1969: 160–61). This is probably a mistake. One *could* go on to say, “namely, they both worship Ba’al” (as Geach does in a later passage), and thereby purport to identify a god. But in saying ‘the same god’ one does not purport to identify anything. Geach should say instead that one *purports to commit to there being a god*. Purporting to identify a god is one way to do that, but it is not the only way. (Likewise, in asserting G, the reporter does not purport to identify a witch, but only purports to commit to there being one.)

24. So does ‘Smith believes a certain man to have reigned over Britain, and Jones believes the very same man to have built this hill-fort’ (1969: 163).

25. So do these examples: ‘Hob and Nob meant to refer to the same person’ (1967: 150), and ‘Hob or Nob may have [i.e., ‘Maybe Hob and Nob each has’] more than one definite description “of that person” that he might produce’ (ibid., 152 n 1), and ‘two men [are] worshippers of the same God’ (*sic*, 1969: 160–61). A more complex example begins in this form, and then conjoins a second such report and denies a third, using elided verb-phrases: ‘Hob and Bob might “refer to her” with the same description in mind, and likewise Bob and Nob, but not Hob and Nob’ (1967: 152 n 1). (Here and in a few other quotes, I change Geach’s single quotation-marks to doubles, and vice versa, to fit the usual American philosophical use.) Note well: though these reports have only one occurrence of an intentional predicate, they report multiple intentional states. The predication is not *collective* (as in ‘we elected the president’), but *distributive* (Geach, 1980: 97)—in this case, that means the report is equivalent to one of form I1. Note also that ‘the same ϕ ’ in the form I2 is not a pronominal phrase; if it were, it would be elliptical for something like ‘the same ϕ as previously mentioned’. Instead, it is elliptical for something like ‘the same ϕ that all the other $\alpha_i \Psi_i$ ’.

26. The other example is ‘Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders whether she (that same witch) killed Cob’s sow’ (1967: 151–52). These intrasubjective cases belie some commentators (e.g., Asher 1987: 152–53; and Pietarinen 2001: 161–62), who assume intentional

quantifies over agents or state-tokens: ‘A man...dreams of the same girl night after night’ (1969: 161), and ‘Many critics admired one and the same poet’ (ibid., 164–65). Finally, he sometimes substitutes a proper name for the indefinite description or for PRO_ϕ , or adds it as a “namely-rider”: ‘He dreams of Petronella every night’ and
5 ‘Hannibal and Hasdrubal did worship the same God, namely Baal’ (sic 1969: 161).²⁷ In all these cases, Geach thinks there is a real identity reading and an intentional identity reading. This sets the context for his puzzle.²⁸

4 THE PUZZLE, AS GEACH UNDERSTANDS IT

Geach’s puzzle is to analyze a certain compound report:

10 G Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob’s sow.

Specifically, the puzzle is to analyze its alleged intentional identity reading. So Geach assumes the following. (References in this section are to his 1967, except where noted.)

15 A1 There is no witch such that Hob thinks she has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob’s sow.

Specifically, he says the reporter could consistently assert G without committing to there being witches (148). But it is simpler to restate the case in terms of what is true, rather than what the reporter commits to. He also assumes:

20 A2 There is *nothing* such that Hob thinks it has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders whether it killed Cob’s sow.

I take it he assumes A2 because he says there is not even a *person* whom Hob’s and Nob’s attitudes are about (ibid., see below), and because in his general descriptions, the alleged intentional identity reading is one on which the reported intentional
25 states need not share *any* object (147, 151). Finally, he assumes:

identity reports must refer to distinct agents, or that the intrasubjective case is unproblematic. See Edelberg (2006) on this point.

27. His other case is ‘Wewena, Chuckery, and Cougheda all worship the same God, Mumbo Jumbo’ (1969: 162).

28. In one of the most cited responses to Geach’s paper, Edelberg (1986) argues that besides handling cases such as G, an analysis of intentional identity must also handle what he calls “asymmetric intentional identity” (12–17). But his cases of the latter are not intentional identity at all: he stipulates that the agents’ attitudes are notional (“neither [agent] has anyone in mind”). One need not solve this “new puzzle of intentional identity” to solve Geach’s puzzle. Compare van Rooy’s criticism (2006: 142–43).

A3 Hob's thought and Nob's wondering are nonnotional.

Specifically, he says that this is a case where "we take ourselves to know...that they are meaning to refer to some one person or thing" (151). Later he says that in this situation Gothamites could introduce an ad hoc proper name such as 'Maggoty Meg',
5 by which we could purport to identify a shared object of Hob's and Nob's attitudes (1976: 314–15).

Still, it is tempting to read G in ways Geach does not intend. So he fleshes out the situation to isolate the right reading. Some of this extra material is helpful, but some is confusing. I will discuss four passages. First, he rejects this analysis:

10 G1 As regards somebody, Hob thinks that she is a witch and has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow. (148)

His objection is that it "would imply that Hob and Nob had some one person in mind as a suspected witch; whereas it might be the case, to the knowledge of our reporter, that Hob and Nob merely thought there was a witch around and their sus-
15 pisions had not yet settled on a particular person" (ibid.). There are three problems. First, the two claims he denies, 'Hob and Nob had some one person in mind' and 'Hob and Nob's suspicions had settled on a particular person' can be read as stating *intentional* identity (in form I2) rather than *real* identity, and on that reading it is OK if G entails them. Second, he also says that instead of G1, what might be true
20 is 'Hob and Nob merely thought there was a witch around'. But that differs from G1 mainly in that its most natural reading is *notional*, which is *not* what we want from a paraphrase of G. Third, he seems to conflate Hob and Nob having nonnotional attitudes with their knowing *who* (or *what*) their attitudes are about. These are quite different. Having a nonnotional attitude requires *some* way of identifying
25 its object, but *knowing what its object is* requires more. For example, I can hate the person who stole my car without knowing who did it.²⁹ And if G or G1 were true on their real identity readings, then Hob and Nob could have had attitudes about this witch/woman without having "one person in mind as a suspected witch," i.e., without "their suspicions [having] settled on a particular person," because these
30 suggest they *know who she is* (cf. Barense, 1969). Likewise, if I purport to say there is a witch or a woman Hob and Nob have nonnotional attitudes about, I need not purport to say or think that they know who she is. They might each tell me, "The witch I was referring to is Maggoty Meg, although I don't know who that is; if I knew that, I would tell the constable." These epistemic issues are irrelevant to the

29. See Salmon (1988: 205–6, 213 n 17) for this distinction and some references.

puzzle. It would be simpler for Geach to reject G₁ simply because it entails Hob's and Nob's attitudes share an object.

In the second passage (150) he considers paraphrasing the occurrence of 'she' as a pronoun of laziness, specifically as standing in for 'the witch who blighted Bob's mare':

G₂ Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether the witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow.

He rejects it, "for our reporter might be justified in asserting" G as an intentional identity report "if he had heard Hob say 'The witch has blighted Bob's mare' and heard Nob say 'Maybe the witch killed Cob's sow', even if Hob had not thought or said anything about Cob's sow nor Nob about Bob's mare." He seems to take G₂ as a notional reading: the occurrence of 'the witch who blighted Bob's mare' describes the notional content of Nob's attitude, rather than simply describing the object of his attitude. He could reject it on that ground alone, because the notional reading is irrelevant. But to make that reading less tempting, let us stipulate:

s₁ Hob had not thought or said anything about Cob's sow nor Nob about Bob's mare.

In the third passage (151–52) he raises an independent problem for paraphrases like G₂, which use a definite description in Nob's attitude report. He assumes the definite description is analyzable; he accepts the Russellian analysis of 'the witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow' (taken in isolation) as 'just one witch blighted Bob's mare and she killed Cob's sow'. But he doubts whether they are equivalent in the context of G₂, i.e. that G₂'s second conjunct entails 'Nob wonders whether (the following is the case:) just one witch blighted Bob's mare, and she killed Cob's sow'. He does not say why, but it is likely because that attitude report is *notional*, contrary to A₃. Instead, he suggests analyzing G₂'s second conjunct as 'Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (that same witch) killed Cob's sow'. Why this? Again, he does not say. But it is more or less a Strawsonian presuppositional analysis, a common alternative to the Russellian.³⁰ In any case, he rejects that analysis too: given the stipulations so far, it can only be read as another intentional identity report. Thus since G₂, on its best analysis, "would introduce intentional identity over again," it "is quite useless as a way of getting rid of intentional identity" (152). Of course, this objection depends on the Strawsonian analysis being the best—or more generally, it assumes

30. Thanks to Salmon for suggesting this reading of the third passage.

that G₂'s second conjunct is best analyzed as a compound attitude report with at least one nonnotional attitude. And it assumes that the intentional identity report introduced is just as hard to analyze as G (which some commentators would deny; see n 26). That is a lot to assume. More conservatively, Geach could object that such paraphrases of G₂ either make Nob's attitude report notional, or they violate s₁ in the way they link Hob's and Nob's attitudes. The Russellian analysis has both flaws; the Strawsonian avoids the first, but not the second.

Finally, in the fourth passage (152–53) he considers a general paraphrase strategy, for some common noun phrase *F*:

10 G₃ Hob thinks that the (one and only) witch that is *F* has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether the witch that is *F* killed Cob's sow. (152)

He says this has the previous problem: analyzing the 'Nob wonders' clause seems to produce another report of intentional identity. Again, I suggest a different objection: G₃ makes the attitudes notional, violating A₃. Aside from that, his response to 15 G₃ is odd. He says that "on the face of it," if G₃ is true for any *F* then G is true (waiving some unidentified difficulties). But he doubts the converse, i.e., that G entails that for some *F* G₃ is true. He repeats that G could be true even if Hob said "The witch has blighted Bob's mare" and Nob said "Maybe the witch killed Cob's sow," so long as they both use 'the witch' meaning to refer to the same person. About 20 this case he asks:

Now is it in truth necessary, if Hob and Nob are to mean to refer to the same person as "the witch," that they should both have some one definite description actually in mind, or even, one producible from each of them by a suitable technique of questioning? This appears to me to stand or fall 25 with the corresponding theory, held by Russell and by Frege..., that any ordinary proper name is used equivocally if it does not go proxy for some one definite description; and in spite of these great names, such a theory seems to me extremely ill-founded and implausible. (152–53; cf. 1969: 155–56)

Is this a trick question? If they use the same description ('the witch'), then *of course* 30 they have the same description in mind. And what could that have to do with descriptivism about proper names?

I suggest Geach *does not* think 'the witch' is the description Hob and Nob "have in mind" when they use 'the witch', at least not in the special sense that each (purportedly) *identifies* the object of his attitude as the thing satisfying that description. 35 So how *do* they (purport to) identify it? Assuming they do so by description, it is a sensible question whether Hob and Nob must both have exactly one and the same

description in mind. And this *is* analogous to the question whether two people using the same proper name (univocally) must both have exactly one and the same description in mind as fixing its referent. The answer is no: neither is necessary. Why not? He says Hob and Nob might have multiple descriptions in mind, and more importantly, that they need not *share* any (or all) of their descriptions. His counterexample is that Hob and Nob might each *share a description* “of that person” with Bob, but not with one another (152 n 1). (Note that this counterexample is equivalent to two intentional identity reports plus the denial of a third; see above, n 25.) It is not clear how deep Geach thinks this example cuts.³¹ He might intend that Hob and Nob need not share *any* way of (purportedly) identifying the objects of their attitudes. This is how Salmon reads him (2002: 110), and in §5.3 I will argue this is what he *ought* to say. But he does not say it here, and his analyses of intentional identity in other papers (see §5.3) suggest he would deny it. So, finally, I add this conservative stipulation to rule out G3:

s2 G can be true even if there is no shared definite description by which both Hob and Nob purport to identify an object of their respective attitudes.

5 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

There are dozens of proposed solutions to the puzzle, and this paper is a small fraction of the length needed to do justice to all their nonstandard machinery. But I *can* summarize the literature by evaluating solutions on very narrow grounds, namely by whether Geach has a conclusive reason to reject them. In these terms, there are three general kinds of response. The first reject or ignore one of his assumptions or stipulations. The second rely on uninterpreted technical apparatuses, and so are incomplete. The rest are metarepresentational, and have problems I will explain in §5.3. Then in §6, when I assess his views, I will reassess a few solutions, the handful that are even slightly promising.

5.1 *Solutions diverging from Geach*

Most commentators diverge from Geach’s understanding of the puzzle, by rejecting or ignoring one of his assumptions or stipulations.

Terence Parsons straightforwardly rejects A1, saying that *there is* a witch Hob’s and Nob’s attitudes are about, although he says it is a “nonexistent” witch (1974:

31. Elsewhere he says we can use a name for something if we have inherited the name ultimately from someone acquainted with that thing, whether or not we know there is such a link (1969: 155). This suggests, but does not entail, that we can competently use the name without having *any* description “in mind” as identifying its referent.

577–78).³² A few others grant A1, but reject A2; they say the shared object is not (really or actually) a witch.³³ And others seem to accept A1 and A2, but still analyze G on a real identity reading, embedded in a further intentional operator. In effect they say that someone commits to “real identity”: either Nob, the Gotham community, or some unidentified representer.³⁴ But when Geach says the reporter could assert G without commitment to “real identity,” his point is not that the committed person is distinct from the reporter, but that there is a noncommittal reading of G. A description of someone’s committal representation of the situation G reports is not a noncommittal reading of G.

10 Many commentators reject or ignore A3, that Hob’s thought and Nob’s wondering are nonnotional. Some of them explain the connection between Hob’s and Nob’s notional attitudes in terms of Nob thinking about Bob’s mare, contrary to s1.³⁵ Some explain the connection by Hob and Nob using the same definite description to identify alleged objects of their attitudes, contrary to s2.³⁶ Others either do
15 not explain the connection, or explain it in terms of something other than the content of notional attitudes.³⁷ And others reject or ignore s1 or s2, without clearly

32. See also Robin Cooper (2005: 344–47), who wholly ignores Geach’s distinction between real and intentional identity. He also seems to ignore A3 and s1.

33. See Castañeda (1974: 47–48), Cocchiarella (1989: 31–32), Salmon (2002: 116–17 and nn 26–27), and Graham Priest (2005: 65 n 12).

34. Howard Burdick (1982: 209) does not identify the representer. Tyler Burge’s first paraphrase (1983: 96) is ambiguous:

G* According to the community’s hysterical beliefs, there is a witch wreaking havoc, and as regards that witch, Hob thinks she has blighted, ...and Nob thinks she has killed...[sic]

On one reading this is merely a more complex (and still unanalyzed) intentional identity report, adding to G a *third* attitude report, of the community’s (collective?) belief. On the other, it says the community commits to “real identity.” (Furthermore, on either reading, community belief probably requires individual belief, and in this case intentional identity: each villager of Gotham believes there is a witch (the same witch) such that Hob...and Nob.... So on either reading, G* paraphrases G as a more complex and unanalyzed intentional identity report.) Edelberg (in his “perspectival” analysis, 1992: 589–95; see also his 1995) and Berger (2002: ch 6) analyze G only *from someone’s perspective*. As far as I can tell is a way of describing one representer’s attitudes about the situation, and both of them take that representer to commit to “real identity.” Edelberg does not identify the representer for this case, while Berger picks Nob—or rather, discusses a belief Nob *would* have if he were ideally rational and better informed. (Burge and Edelberg also give metarepresentational analyses, which I discuss in §5.3.)

35. See Michael McKinsey (1986: 162–64, 168–69), King (1993: 74, 76), Robert van Rooy and Thomas Ede Zimmerman (1996: 133–35), and William G. Lycan (1994: 126–27).

36. See D.C. Dennett (1968: 337–38), Zeevat (2000: 304–5), Richard Breheny (2003: 8), and once again McKinsey, King, and van Rooy and Zimmerman.

37. See Robert Kraut (1983: 277–79, 288–91), Pietarinen (1999: 15–17; 2001: 148), Berger (2002:

rejecting A3.³⁸

5.2 Solutions with uninterpreted machinery

Most solutions appeal to novel logical or philosophical machinery, and some of it may be problematic. Rather than review it all, I will focus on commentators who do not clearly reject or ignore one of Geach's assumptions or stipulations, but whose solution is incomplete because they do not interpret some of their machinery. These include analyses in terms of either Hintikka's modal theory of intentional constructions, dynamic semantics, or Hilbert's ϵ -calculus.

Many commentators analyze $\lceil \alpha \Psi a \phi \rceil$ after Hintikka's (1969) analysis of $\lceil \alpha \Psi \gamma \rceil$ (where γ is a singular term): he replaces Ψ with a modal operator (e.g., $\lceil \alpha$ believes \rceil becomes \lceil in all possible worlds compatible with what α believes \rceil), and assigns to γ a function from worlds to individuals (a "world-line"). (This is to treat intentional operators as Carnap-intensional, contrary to Geach and good sense.) These commentators assign such functions to the occurrences of 'she' and 'a witch', and say that for some (or all) worlds at which the functions are defined, they have the same value. On this view, what makes one reading of G report intentional identity rather than real identity is that the functions are not defined at the actual world. Most of these commentators also say the functions are inconstant, having different values at different worlds, as a way to model the attitudes' being notional (contrary to A3).³⁹ But even those with nonnotional analyses must explain what sort of attitudes their Hintikkan formal model represents. Do Hob and Nob have relational attitudes toward a nonactual object? Then this is a real identity reading after all. Or do the functions stand in for mental representations? I discuss such metarepresentational analyses in §5.3. Maybe other interpretations are possible; but without some interpretation this approach simply translates the problem of analyzing intentional identity reports, and more generally quasirelational reports, to the (newer and less intuitive) problem of explaining attitudes involving world-lines undefined

140–41, for Hob only), and van Rooy (2006: 129). See also Stephen Neale (1990: 221) and Craig Roberts (1996: 16–17), who do not reject s2 explicitly, but may mean to.

38. See Geach (1964a: 137–38) himself; I discuss this analysis in §5.3. In an analogous case L. Jonathan Cohen (1968: 330, 332) gives truth conditions for one agent's attitude that include those of the other agent's. Takeo Kurafuji (2007: 435) seems to accept A3, but describes Hob's and Nob's attitudes in terms of a shared "guise" which he seems to explain in terms of a definite description. I am not sure what he means; I will mention his view again in §5.3.

39. See Kraut, Lycan, van Rooy and Zimmerman, Pietarinen, Zeevat, and van Rooy (references in nn 35–37). The exceptions are Saarinen (1978: 195, 201–3), Roberts (1996: 16–17), and Ephraim Glick (2011).

at the actual world.

Several other theorists analyze G in terms of dynamic semantics, often in the form of discourse representation theory.⁴⁰ This semantics is built on some controversial assumptions, the most relevant one being that indefinite descriptions are not existential quantifier phrases, but (in many or all cases) “establish discourse referents” (Karttunen, 1976)—or as other theorists say, “give rise to reference markers” (Kamp, 1985), “contribute parametric objects,” (Moltmann, 2006), etc. The problem is that these terms have two very different kinds of interpretations, and some theorists do not say which one they intend. On one interpretation, the relevant occurrences of indefinite descriptions stand in for variables bound by existential quantifiers whose scope is not narrower than any other operator in the discourse. Expression-occurrences that are anaphoric on those indefinite-description-occurrences stand in for further occurrences of the same bound variables (see, e.g., Heim, 1988: 253). Applied to G, this simply yields the real identity reading ‘ $\exists x(\text{Hob thinks } x \text{ is a witch} \wedge \text{Nob wonders whether } x \text{ killed Cob's sow})$ ’, which of course is not the one Geach intends.⁴¹ On the other interpretation, discourse referents are *representations*; occurrences of indefinite descriptions, at least when they follow intentional operators, refer to representations, and pronoun-occurrences anaphoric on those description-occurrences refer to the same representations.⁴² Applied to G this yields a metarepresentational analysis of the sort I discuss in §5.3. But some theorists do not make clear which of the two interpretations they prefer, and so their solutions cannot be evaluated.⁴³

Barry Hartley Slater’s account (1988: 98) is incomplete in a more idiosyncratic way. He analyzes pronouns anaphoric on indefinite descriptions using Hilbert’s ‘ ϵ ’

40. See Hans Kamp (1985: 257–59), Asher (1987: 151–55), Moltmann (2006: 249–50), and Samuel J. Cumming (2007: 73, 78–79). (See also Zeevat (1987: esp. 197–99; 2000: 289, 298, 304–5, 307), van Rooy (2000: 165–67, 171–73; 2006: 129, 139–42), and (1996: 123–24, 133–35). Their solutions combine dynamic semantics with Hintikkan analyses of attitude reports, and likely make the attitudes notional.)

41. Dynamic semantics assigns truth-conditions only to whole discourses. I am assuming G is the whole discourse, but if it is part of some larger discourse, the latter will be assigned truth-conditions such that it entails G’s real identity reading.

42. This may be the view of van Rooy (with and without Dekker and Zimmerman) and Zeevat, cited in note 40; but their Hintikkan analyses of attitude reports obscures the issue.

43. As far as I can tell, Kamp, Asher, and Cumming leave this open (in the works cited in note 40). Moltmann is explicitly neutral. And her response has a further problem, because she says that her substitute case ‘John believes that someone broke into the house. Mary believes that he just stumbled in’, reports a *collective* belief of John and Mary. Even if we can make sense of her reading, it is not the one Geach intends (see above, n 25).

operator. I will define ‘ ε ’ for a relatively simple case (cf. Slater, 2005). For extensional predicates ϕ and ψ containing no free variables, ‘ $\varepsilon\alpha\phi\alpha$ ’ is a singular term such that ‘ $\exists x\phi x$ ’ \vdash ‘ $\phi\varepsilon\alpha\phi\alpha$ ’ and ‘ $\forall x(\phi x \leftrightarrow \psi x)$ ’ \vdash ‘ $\varepsilon\alpha\phi\alpha = \varepsilon\alpha\psi\alpha$ ’. When ϕ is satisfied, ‘ $\varepsilon\alpha\phi\alpha$ ’ denotes a certain satisfier of ϕ , the one picked out by a certain
 5 choice function—for example, Hilbert’s choice function for the domain of natural numbers, which maps each predicate to the *least* number satisfying it (if any). (So on Hilbert’s interpretation, we can read ‘ $\varepsilon\alpha\phi\alpha$ ’ as ‘the least thing α such that $\phi\alpha$ ’.) Stated in mostly English, this is Slater’s paraphrase of G:

G4 Hob thinks that there is a witch who has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders
 10 whether $\varepsilon x(x$ is a witch who has blighted Bob’s mare) killed Cob’s sow.

G4 has several problems. First, it ascribes to Hob only a notional attitude, contrary to A3. Perhaps Slater should add, between the two reports, ‘and Hob thinks, of $\varepsilon x(x$ is a witch who has blighted Bob’s mare), that she is a witch who has blighted Bob’s mare’. Second, ε -terms have scope, which G4 leaves ambiguous: on one reading Nob’s attitude is toward the ε -term’s extension (disambiguated with λ : ‘ $\lambda x(\text{Nob } \Psi x)\varepsilon\alpha\phi\alpha$ ’), and on the other reading the attitude report is notional. Since he acknowledges s1 (93), I assume he means the former. Third, our domain is not the natural numbers, so we cannot use Hilbert’s choice function, and Slater does not give another. However, this is a special case, where nothing satisfies the predicate,
 15 and so the choice function could not pick a satisfier anyway. Slater says that when nothing satisfies ϕ , ‘ $\varepsilon\alpha\phi\alpha$ ’ denotes the object that, by stipulation, all empty descriptions denote, perhaps the empty set (call this the *garbage object*).⁴⁴ I assume this requires further interpretation, but as far as I know he gives none. That is the fourth and worst problem. At face value, G4 entails Nob wonders about the garbage
 20 object, which is not only very unlikely but makes the attitude *relational*, violating A2. If this is not Slater’s meaning, then he has at best only restated Geach’s problem of analyzing quasirelational and intentional identity reports (with indefinite descriptions as arguments of the intentional predicates) as the problem of analyzing sentences such ‘ $\alpha \Psi \varepsilon x\phi x$ ’ when ϕ is unsatisfied. This restatement does not
 25 solve the puzzle, and I doubt Geach would see any benefit in it, because I see none myself.

44. There are of course other options for treating nondenoting descriptions: see, e.g., Carnap (1947: §8). As Slater notes (2005: §1), Hilbert and Bernays effectively treat them as unevaluable due to a failed presupposition.

5.3 Metarepresentational solutions

All the remaining solutions are *metarepresentational*. They read G as ascribing to Hob and Nob not only attitudes, but ways of (purportedly) mentally representing the objects of their attitudes. I will call those ways *modes of presentation* (MOPs).

5 Commentators differ in their views on MOPs, sometimes in ways relevant to the puzzle. On some views, MOPs are *descriptive*: they represent something (if anything) *by* representing certain conditions; they thereby represent whatever (if anything) uniquely meets those conditions. Many such MOPs are expressible by definite descriptions, such as ‘the man in the mirror’, but I do not assume that all descriptive
10 MOPs are so expressible.⁴⁵ Other views allow *nondescriptive* MOPs: these (purport to) represent things not merely by representing conditions for something to meet, but at least in part by having some nonrepresentational link to those things. For example, my visual MOP of my cell phone represents it not because my phone is the only thing that looks a certain way, but in part because I formed the MOP
15 by looking at my phone. The two kinds of MOPs are individuated differently. Descriptive ones are typically individuated by their content alone, in which case two agents might share one without being historically connected in any relevant way. Nondescriptive ones are individuated (at least partly) historically; if they are shareable at all, then to acquire a preexisting one an agents must gain a nonrepresentational relation to referent (or maybe to the MOP’s origin). One way to do this
20 is to communicate with someone who already has the MOP. The two kinds of MOP may also contribute differently to attitudes: it may be that any attitude invoking a *descriptive* MOP is thereby *notional*. In the following I will only consider analyses ascribing Hob and Nob nonnotional attitudes.

25 There are two families of metarepresentational solutions. The first say that Hob’s and Nob’s attitudes must invoke the *same* MOP purportedly of a witch. In his first discussion of intentional identity, Geach gives such an analysis of ‘Smith and Brown both admire the same poet’:

M1 For some w , w is a definite description, and Smith and Brown both admire-
30 as-a-poet-someone-conceived-under-the-*ratio*-evoked-by w . (1964a: 138)

(‘*Ratio*’ is Buridan’s term, roughly equivalent to Frege’s ‘*Sinn*’. ‘Looking-for-...-evoked-by’ is an unanalyzable relative term (137); cf. Church 1956: 8 n 20.) To extend this to G, we might use two unanalyzable relative terms, maybe ‘think to be a witch who has blighted Bob’s mare someone conceived under the *ratio* evoked by’

45. Compare Salmon (2005: 15) on descriptive singular terms, and Burge (2010: 12-22, chs 4-7) on “individual representationalism.”

and ‘wonder whether she (is a witch who) killed Cob’s sow someone...’. Aside from being very awkward, this wrongly packs logically significant structure into unanalyzable predicates; the analysis would not entail, as it should, that Hob thinks Bob’s mare has been blighted, among other things. But even if we dealt with that problem, there would be another: it entails that there is a shared definite description by which both Hob and Nob purport to identify objects of their respective attitudes. And no doubt this is exactly the sort of analysis Geach was thinking of in stipulating s2.⁴⁶

In his 1976, instead of shyly quantifying over definite descriptions as senseproxies, he quantifies directly over senses of proper names, which he calls *aspects* (313, 315). (He understands them as “uses,” including possible uses that merely *could* be given to a name.) As in his 1967 (152–53), he rejects the descriptivist view that each aspect can be expressed by a single definite description, *the* description used to (purportedly) identify the referent (1976: 315).⁴⁷ To quantify over aspects in attitude reports, he uses a bracket notation based on Quine’s quasiquotation: within the brackets, Greek-letter variables range over aspects, while other expressions’ extensions are their senses (316; I will substitute German for Greek).⁴⁸ So he analyzes the quasirelational reading of ‘Jones believes a detective can *F*’ as:

m2 For some α , α is a detective-aspect and Jones believes [α can *F*]. (317)

Geach suggests this technique can solve his puzzle, though he does not apply it (318). I think he has in mind something like this:

G5 For some α such that α is a witch-aspect, Hob thinks [α has blighted Bob’s mare], and Nob wonders whether [α killed Cob’s sow].⁴⁹

Some commentators give similar analyses. Michael Pendlebury’s and Mark Crim-

46. This one, or another one he maybe *meant* to give. m1 does not follow the pattern he set with his analyses of simple quasirelational reports (137). Following that pattern, his analysis should be:

m* Smith and Brown both admire-someone-conceived-under-the-*ratio*-evoked-by ‘poet’.

He describes the second arguments of these unanalyzable relative terms as definite descriptions (despite writing them as common noun phrases such as ‘poet’ and ‘detective story’), so a m*-like analysis of G would also violate s2.

47. He may still think all aspects are descriptive in my sense. Aspects might not be expressible by a single definite description merely because they are expressible by more than one, or because the conditions they represent are themselves not expressible in a description.

48. Compare Kaplan’s capital-^M meaning marks (1969: 214). Thanks to Salmon for this reference.

49. Salmon (2002: 110), seemingly on the basis of the 1967 passage about s2, reads Geach as suggesting Hob and Nob grasp distinct aspects. But I read that passage more conservatively (see §4). In any case, I discuss distinct-MOP analyses below.

mins's analyses are simply notational variants of G5 in terms of "modes of mental reference" and "modes of presentation," respectively.⁵⁰ Likewise, Matts Dallhöf (1995: 146) requires that Hob's and Nob's attitudes involve the same "individual concept" (38). And Takeo Kurafuji (1999: 203–4; 2007: 435), requires that the attitudes share a "guise" or "acquaintance relation." It is not always clear whether these theorists mean the MOPs to be descriptive, but they do not clearly mean them to be expressible by a (single) definite description, and so they do not clearly violate s2 (but see n 38).

All these metarepresentational solutions are implausible for two reasons. First, they are doubtful linguistically. On its face, G does not say anything about MOPs. It does not *identify* which MOPs are involved in Hob's and Nob's attitudes, since it does not even purport to identify which *witch* is a shared object of their attitudes. And it seems not to be a generalization about MOPs like G5 is, because if the anaphoric occurrence of 'she' stands for anything, it stands for an *object* of Nob's attitude, not a MOP by which he purports to represent such an object. This is even clearer in compound reports of forms Geach ignored, using determiner phrases other than indefinite descriptions, such as 'exactly two witches' or 'most witches'.⁵¹ Take this variant of G:

G^M Hob thinks most witches have blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether they (the same witches) killed Cob's sow.

G^M is problematic in all the ways G is: we are tempted to say it has a nonnotional reading that can be true even if there are no witches. And it has an obvious analogue of G5:

G^M₅ For most α such that α is a witch-aspect, Hob thinks [α has blighted Bob's mare], and Nob wonders whether [α killed Cob's sow].

But this is not what G^M says. Suppose that there are exactly five witch-aspects, and that three of them are purportedly of a witch known as Willow, while the other two are purportedly of distinct witches known respectively as Tara and Amy. And suppose that Hob and Nob clarify their attitudes to the reporter: Hob says, "I think both Tara and Amy have blighted Bob's mare," and Nob says, "I wonder whether both Tara and Amy killed Cob's sow." Asserting G^M is a natural way to report this

50. See Pendlebury (1982: 352–54), who ironically rejects G5 for its "extravagant and unnecessary ontological commitments" (348–49). And see Crimmins (1998: 40), whose analysis states the conditions for G to be pretend-true; he does not say whether G is really true.

51. Pietarinen (2001: 160) briefly mentions such cases, and Mark Richard (1998: 269–73) discusses both simple and compound reports with 'two'.

situation, just as asserting G is a natural way to report Geach's original situation. (In fact, asserting G is a natural way to report this situation if we purport to focus only on Tara or only on Amy.) So allegedly there would be a true intentional identity reading of G^M ; but the analysis G_5^M is false, because their Hob's and Nob's attitudes involve only two of the five witch-aspects, and so not *most* of them. This shows that Hob's and Nob's attitudes, in both G^M and G , are characterized by their purported *objects*, not by the MOPS they involve.

Still, I expect that some theorists will insist there must be an analysis of G according to which Hob's and Nob's attitudes involve a shared MOP. Assume there is one. The second problem is that the analysis would be false in some cases where G seems to have a true Geachian reading. For example, suppose I say 'Smith and Brown admire the same poet' in the case of the Ern Malley hoax, intending its intentional identity reading. I can do this while leaving open whether Smith and Brown have different MOPS purportedly of Ern Malley—for example, maybe Smith purports to think of him as the author of "Durer: Innsbruck, 1495," while Brown purports to think of him as the author of "Palinode" (those being two poems from the hoax). Geach would call this a case of intentional identity, but a same-MOP analysis of the sentence would come out false. Likewise, suppose Hob purportedly thinks of the witch who blighted Bob's mare as the most evil person in town, while Nob purportedly thinks of the witch whom he wonders about as the most powerful person in town—and thus their attitudes involve distinct MOPS—but that both came to believe there is a witch by talking (separately) to Rob. In that case, G_5 is false, but G seems just as true as in the situation Geach described. Thus same-MOP analyses, including Geach's, are wrong.

The other family of metarepresentational analyses say that the MOPS involved in Hob's and Nob's attitudes may be distinct, as long as they are suitably related. Some of the theorists I discussed in §5.2 might have something like this in mind, if they understand their "world-lines" or "discourse referents" as MOPS. And Tyler Burge and Walter Edelberg give such analyses explicitly. Burge's sketch of a formal analysis (1983: 97–98) refers to or quantifies over Hob's and Nob's "applications" (acts of *de re* mental representation). The two applications belong to the same "quasi-anaphoric chain" (91–94); he represents this formally by giving anaphorically linked terms the same numerical subscript, which "requires that any referent of the terms be the same" (98).⁵² And Edelberg (1992: 572–76, 582–84) says Hob's and Nob's attitudes each involve "I-objects" (i.e., MOPS; 'I' stands for 'intermedi-

52. Compare Breheny (2003: 8), who says there is a "notion network" such that Hob and Nob both believe there is something at the end of it. Unlike Burge's analysis, this makes the attitudes notional.

ate' or 'intentional'), and that one of Hob's I-objects is related to one of Nob's, either causally-historically or by "rough similarity of explanatory role." (This is his *nonperspectival* account; for his *perspectival* one, see n 34 above. The latter relation is probably too weak. Suppose Hob is from Gotham and Nob from Tokyo, and that they have no relevant historical links; then it is much harder to make sense of the claim that they have nonnotional attitudes about "the same witch."⁵³) Instead, the MOPS must have the same ultimate source, such as the same myth originating with Rob. In general, related-MOP analyses will have something like the following form, where *R* stands for an appropriate relation:

10 G6 For some (witch-)MOPS *a* and *b* such that *Rab*, Hob thinks [*a* is a witch who has blighted Bob's mare], and Nob wonders whether [*b* killed Cob's sow].

G6 has a linguistic problem like G5's: G seems not to say anything about MOPS, and seems even less to say anything about a certain relation between MOPS (cf. Salmon, 2002: 110–11). G6 may capture the conditions under which it is intuitive that there is a nonnotional but noncommittal reading of the sort Geach alleges—
15 the conditions that he would call the *truth*-conditions of G's intentional identity reading. (More on that in §6.) But what we lack is a *semantics* for G on that alleged reading, an account of how *those words, combined in that way*, say what G6 says. G is not idiomatic; if it has such a literal reading, then there must be some explanation how it is generated from G's parts and their arrangement. Of course
20 it is not obvious what are G's semantically significant parts or modes of combination; if we had that, we would have an analysis. And it is doubtful there will be such an analysis. As Geach understands it, G is composed of two simple reports on their alleged quasirelational readings, plus an anaphoric link. Neither simple
25 report, even on that alleged reading, seems to say anything about features of MOPS such as their histories or relations to other MOPS. And I do not see how, when the reports are combined by a conjunction and an anaphoric link, reference to MOP-relations could emerge. Besides that, Geach predicts intentional identity readings of several sentences with no anaphora, in cases as simple as 'Smith and Brown admire
30 a poet'. G's complexity seems to dazzle many theorists into proposing the most exotic machinery, with no clue how to pack that into such a simple sentence as 'Smith and Brown admire a poet'.

Furthermore, remember that G is the very same sentence that has a real identity reading. On that reading, none of its parts would *need* to express anything about

53. See van Rooy and Zimmerman (1996: 126–27) and van Rooy (2000: 272–73) note (and cf. Salmon, 2002: 111).

MOP-relations. It takes very narrowly defined cases like the Hob-Nob situation to motivate the alleged intentional identity reading, and it now looks like such cases are our *only* evidence that G, and thus some part(s) of G, is ambiguous. But hard cases make bad semantics. I have illustrated in this section that if G has the alleged intentional identity reading, its semantics is downright exotic, with quantification over or reference to things that normal English-speakers could not begin to suspect. I cannot rule out *a priori* that it has such a reading, because English semantics is an empirical matter. But based on classical semantics for G's components, semantics that are empirically supported by countless other cases, G is about exactly what it seems to be about: four men of Gotham, two livestock mishaps, two intentional states, and perhaps some shared *object* of those states.

And from Geach's perspective, G could only be true if it stated a relation between Hob's and Nob's attitudes such that they (a) share an object, (b) share a MOP, or (c) have suitably related MOPs. He rules out (a) with A1/A2; I argued that the intuitions favoring his alleged reading are independent of (b); and I just argued that (c) is semantically ad hoc.

6 ASSESSMENT OF GEACH'S PROGRAM

Two of Geach's assumptions are particularly shaky. In the puzzle, these come out in stipulations and A2, that G is true and that there is nothing Hob's and Nob's attitudes are about. In effect, I argued in §5.3 that G could not literally state any connection between Hob's and Nob's intentional states, besides *sharing an object*. This is inconsistent with and A2, so at least one of them is illegitimate, as is the assumption motivating it. In fact, there are reasons to doubt both assumptions.

First, consider the assumption that whatever the quasirelational reading is, it is a literal reading; in other words, the relational/quasirelational distinction is one of semantics or logic, in that the quasirelational reading can be *true* while the relational is *false*. (And likewise for the intentional/real identity distinction.) In general, we should not assume that any distinction between two ways of using or understanding an expression must be a semantic distinction (cf. Salmon, 1991). Compare Keith Donnellan's assumption that the distinction between referential and attributive uses of descriptions is semantic. Though this seemed obvious to him, Kripke (1979) and others disagree and argue that the distinction is pragmatic. So we should reconsider Geach's assumption.

Second, consider the assumption that the quasirelational and intentional identity readings do not entail corresponding relational and real identity readings, not even ones stating relations to such objects as dream girls and mythical gods. In effect, Geach dismisses out of hand realism about mythical, fictional, imaginary, and

other such objects. But since he wrote, realism (especially about fictional objects) has become more popular and sophisticated, too much so to ignore. And in fact there are difficult data under Geach's nose. If I say Smith admires a poet, and I purport to identify that poet as Ern Malley, then I at least *purport* to commit to *there being* a poet whom Smith admires—that is, commit to the *relational* reading. Likewise, if I say Smith admires Malley, I should conclude (or purport to, as much as I purported to assert the former) that Malley is admired by Smith. (Geach would say that since I know of the Malley hoax, I am using 'Malley' as a quasiname, in which case it is *undefined* outside an intentional context, and so my second report is untrue. This is, at the least, counterintuitive and controversial.) There are also tough cases for Geach's view that intentional predicates are nonextensional. Suppose Smith falls for the Malley hoax, and so I say Smith admires Malley. Malley is Australia's most famous mythical poet, so it follows—or at least I may purport to validly infer—that Smith admires Australia's most famous mythical poet. Compare Kripke's example: "suppose the Greeks worshipped Zeus, and Zeus is the tenth god mentioned by Livy. Then the Greeks did worship the tenth god mentioned by Livy" (1973: 3.15). So we should reconsider Geach's second assumption too.

If we loosen up on those two issues, the aim of Geach's program is to analyze certain intentional constructions such as 'Hannibal worships a god', which *seem* to be (a) true and (b) consistent with denying that there is any object of the intentional state. Once we drop Geach's other assumptions about these constructions, it is clear what they are: reports of the content of fiction, myth, hallucination, and the like. Compare the case with which I started chapter two: the novel *A Study in Scarlet* is about Sherlock Holmes, but it is somehow sensible to deny that there is such a thing as Holmes, and so deny that the novel is about "him." This problem with reports of fiction content is unsolved; in fact it is awfully subtle and complex, involving all sorts of metaphysical and representational issues. But it is a problem we understand, because it is grounded in familiar, nontechnical matters. On the other hand, Geach explains his program in (admittedly) obscure technical terms, and assumes it concerns an elusive distinction only a skilled logician could identify. So rather than pursue Geach's program as he understands it—in which case we reach a dead end—I loosen his assumptions and reduce it to the more familiar problem.

Given that reduction, we should approach the puzzle by rejecting either or A2. Just one commentator rejects only : Crimmins says G is not literally true, but otherwise sticks to Geach's stipulations. But for G to be pretend-true on his analysis, Hob and Nob must share a MOP, and I argued this is a mistake. Some other metarepresentational analyses do not assume this, and though they were meant

as literal analyses, we might take them nonliterally. But they have other problems. Burge's formal sketch is unclear and underspecified, as he admits.⁵⁴ Hans Kamp, Nicholas Asher, and Samuel J. Cumming's similar analyses (see n 40) are embedded in discourse representation theory, and so make the controversial, and dubious, assumption that separate sentences in the same discourse do not have independent truth conditions. And while Edelberg's nonperspectival account requires that Hob's and Nob's "ideas" be related, he does not motivate any particular sort of historical relation—in fact he leaves open whether the relation is merely similarity of "explanatory role," which seems too weak (see n 53).

However, these commentators' informal discussions motivate a better nonliteral paraphrase: If Hob and Nob believe the same myth—and so, purportedly, believe in the same *mythical witch*—then I suspect something like G6 will be true. A chain (or tree) of communication will connect Hob's and Nob's MOPS to a single origin, perhaps to one person thinking she saw a witch. On the other hand, if their MOPS do not share such a history, then intuitively they do not (even purportedly) represent the same thing. The general idea is to analyze the quasirelational and intentional identity readings as involving a pretense that a myth (or work of fiction, etc.) is true. *Within* that pretense we assert a certain intentional report; we might even pretend to assert it on its relational or real identity reading, making its *pretended* semantics straightforward. *Outside* that pretense, facts about the histories of certain MOPS (such as G6 reports) determine our assertion's pretend-truth-value. This is Walton's strategy for analyzing reports of fiction content (1990: esp. 398–405; cf. 426–30). And that strategy has problems. For example, in asserting that Smith admires Malley, or that Hannibal worshipped Ba'al (assuming Geach is right about Hannibal's religion), I do not seem to be pretending. If I *were*, then I could *stop pretending*, and disavow my pretense; but it is not sensible to retract my claim that Hannibal worshipped Ba'al—that he did seems to be plain fact rather than myth or pretense.⁵⁵ I will not fully assess this strategy here, but I conclude it is not yet quite satisfying.

The other approach to analyzing G begins by (*really*) rejecting A2, and so giving G some kind of *real identity* reading. But if G is literally true on its real identity reading, then there is a *witch* that Hob's and Nob's attitudes are about. If this does

54. See Salmon (2002: 120–21, n 14) for some specific criticisms. And as far as I can tell Burge's formal semantics (1983: 106–10) does not provide truth-conditions (or even pragmatic correctness-conditions) for his analysis, because it does not cover "quasi-anaphora."

55. Compare van Inwagen's arguments against Walton's views on fiction van Inwagen (e.g., his 2003: 136–38).

not follow from the use of ‘a witch’ in the first attitude report, it does from the use of ‘the same witch’ in the gloss of ‘she’: the reporter purports to say not only that Hob’s and Nob’s attitudes concern the same object, but that they concern the same *witch*. So if there are no witches, then G is false. (Likewise, if we drop the gloss
5 ‘the same witch’, the reporter still purports to say that Hob’s and Nob’s attitudes concern the same *female*. But we assumed there is no female whom their attitudes are about, so again G is false.)

So must we also reject and read G nonliterally? Some commentators do not; they admit that there are witches.⁵⁶ Parsons says there are “nonexistent” witches,
10 and that Hob’s and Nob’s attitudes concern one of these. Likewise he says Sherlock Holmes is a nonexistent detective. A major problem with his view is that he thinks these objects are there independent of any human activity; for example, the witch was around independently of anyone in Gotham believing in witches. But intuitively if Hob and Nob think of anything, it is something created in the local
15 witch-mania—just like Conan Doyle wrote stories about a fictional detective whom *he created*, not one that would have been around in any case.⁵⁷

In a related strategy, Nino B. Cocchiarella and Nathan Salmon say ‘witch’ is ambiguous: on one reading, G is false because there are no witches₁, but on another, G is true because Hob’s and Nob’s attitudes concern a witch₂. What is a witch₂?
20 Cocchiarella calls it an “intensional witch.” Such “intensional objects” are “real, abstract individuals that are somehow correlated with predicable concepts,” (18). His explanation of these objects is obscure, but as far as I can tell, since he often says ‘*the* correlate of a concept’, he thinks there is only one correlate of any given concept—one correlate of *witch*, one of *witch who blighted Bob’s mare*, etc. One
25 major problem is that this seems to require that Hob and Nob have attitudes about the same (intensional) witch *because they share a concept* (cf. 17); but I argued they need not do so.

Salmon’s ambiguity view is more promising. In a forthcoming paper he says ‘witch’ can mean *mythical* witch—a mythical object falsely believed to be a witch.⁵⁸

56. Castañeda and Priest (see n 33) say the object is a *merely possible* witch. But G would entail that the object is *actually* a witch, which Priest denies, and Castañeda does not discuss. So they do not defend an analysis of G as literally true.

57. See Fine (1984: esp. 131–33) for this and other criticisms.

58. His original analyses were real identity readings, but with ‘witch’ replaced by ‘mythical witch’ or ‘witch or mythical witch’. Without the ambiguity explanation, this seems like a bit of a cheat, because G does not seem *literally* to say anything about *mythical witches*. (David Braun raises this objection in an unpublished paper, to which Salmon’s paper responds. I knew of the problem independently.)

Compare Kripke's claim that the general term 'god' is ambiguous: "It may be used in such a way that only a pagan believer of the right kind would recognize the existence of the gods on Mount Olympus. But usually we use it otherwise—for example, when we ask, 'How many Greek gods were there?', 'Can you name any of the Greek gods?', and the like" (2011: 64). Dictionaries also give some (defeasible) evidence that we acknowledge such distinctions. So this appeal to ambiguity is not ad hoc. But even if this works for G, it will not work for many other cases. 'Poet' does not have a special sense meaning *mythical poet*, so this does not help us analyze the true intentional identity reading of 'Smith and Brown admire the same poet' (compare my discussion of problematic general terms in §2). So Salmon's response still misses something.

I suggest we reject *both* of Geach's assumptions. Quasirelational and intentional identity readings reduce to relational and real identity readings, *and* many seemingly true reports are not *literally* true. For example, in the Malley case the report 'Smith and Brown admire the same poet' *really* states Smith's and Brown's intentional relations to something, though that thing is not really a poet. In asserting that report, I speak nonliterally, but not as much as a Walton-style pretense analysis would predict. Instead, I *really* say there is something they both admire; the only thing I merely *purport* to say is that this thing is a poet. Why purport (or pretend) to say this, if it is literally false? In a nonphilosophical conversation in the context of common knowledge about the Ern Malley hoax, it is the most natural and effective way to communicate what I intend to. It is more *natural* because we so often slip into talking as if myths, works of fiction, etc. were true. As I explained in chapter one, I think this involves a kind of mental simulation, one that is second nature to us (if not *first* nature, given its connections to other forms of play). Unlike slipping into simulation or pretense, talking clearly and correctly *about* myth or fiction is essentially an intellectual, reflective activity, which some people never learn. And saying the false report is more *effective* than saying 'Smith and Brown admire the same *mythical* poet', because the latter might wrongly emphasize Smith and Brown's mistaken beliefs over their admiration, or wrongly suggest that they *do* know it is a myth but admire Malley anyway. (They might admire him in the sense in which one can admire Sherlock Holmes, even though no fictional character has ever *really* done anything admirable. This is another complex phenomenon, but I will not analyze it here.) So G can have its real identity reading: there is a witch whom Hob thinks (is a witch who) has blighted Bob's mare, and of whom Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow. What keeps the reporter from committing to (real, nonmythical) witches is not an ambiguity in 'witch', or a Walton-style pretense, but only the natural and communicatively effective pretense

that this mythical witch is a witch. It is the littlest of white lies, because in a normal conversation, among relatively unreflective people, with common knowledge that there are no witches, the truth would likely sound stranger than the fiction (i.e., the myth). It would take more work to defend this analysis of G, and the corresponding theories of mythical objects and the means of representing them—especially in comparing it to alternatives like the Waltonian antirealist view and other myth-analogues of views on fiction. That will wait for another paper.

Dozens of theorists have written dozens of papers trying to analyze Geach's logical distinctions. Ironically, this turns out to be another case of intentional identity: *there are no* such logical distinctions. My goal was not to solve the puzzle, but to identify the target of all this attention—and not only *purport* to identify it, by the misleading name 'intentional identity', but *really* identify it. And so, in effect, I have reduced Geach's program to the more familiar and better understood program of analyzing certain discourse about fiction. This has nothing to do with anaphora, or quantified modal logic, or many of the other issues Geach's commentators focus on. Instead, G raises almost exactly the same problems as a sentence about fiction, such as 'A *Study in Scarlet* and *The Hound of the Baskervilles* are about the same detective'. We have not solved those problems yet, but we know where they live.

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